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STRANAHAN LECTURE
PROPERTY RIGHTS CLAIMS OF INDIGENOUS
POPULATIONS: THE VIEW FROM THE COMMON LAW
RichardA. Epstein*
Editor'sNote: The following is an edited and expanded transcriptof Professor
RichardEpstein'sspeech given September 8, 1999 at the StranahanNationalIssues
Forum at the University of Toledo College ofLaw. ProfessorEpstein has written
extensively on governmental takings, privateproperty, and the power of eminent
domain.
I. A PERPETUAL PROBLEM

T

BLE topic of this evening's talk is the property rights of indigenous
populations. At first blush, it seems imprudent to approach this topic
without a detailed knowledge of the particulars of indigenous cultures. Yet my
initial disclaimer is that any such localized knowledge is beyond my ken.
Fortunately, however, a second way in which to approach the topic treats it as yet
another arena in which to test general conceptions of property rights as they have
developed under both the Roman and common law systems. The mission is to
determine whether these principles, which were born and nourished in quite alien
terrain, offer some guidance in understanding a set of interactions that took place
under very different historical circumstances.
Pursuing this course of action is not offered as a simple exercise in apologetics
for a dominant culture. The operative rules of Western legal systems (both Roman
and common law) are phrased in both general and neutral terms. As with other
neutral principles, these general propositions can, so to speak, come back to bite the
hand that feeds them. That reversal of fortune can happen even with neutral
principles adopted for partisan reasons. Foresight is imperfect, and some groups
can often prevail under rules that were adopted with the view of advancing the
interests and purposes of other groups, including their rivals. The requirement of
neutrality does not fully constrain opportunism within the legal realm. But, it does
crimp the style of those who might otherwise yield to legal temptation.
With that caveat in mind, the lesson I hope you take away from this exercise is
that we need relatively few strong principles to understand the organization of
political and legal systems. Correctly understood, these insights about property
rights travel well between cultures whose internal practices diverge in important
*James
Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago. LL.B.,
Yale University (1968); B.A., Oxford University (1966); A.B., Columbia College (1964).
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ways from each other. I regard this message as optimistic in an area that is tom by
conflict, for it holds out the possibility of agreeing on a conceptual framework that
might allow for the resolution of long-simmering disputes.
The treatment of indigenous property rights has enormous salience today. The
arduous migration of peoples in search of better living conditions has often led to
a clash of cultures. Sometimes culture clashes result in successful adjustments;
sometimes in uneasy accommodations; and sometimes in outright violence. The
issue of indigenous property rights is of obvious importance in the United States,
given the interactions between the white settlers and-here the choice of words
becomes critical-the Indian tribes (as they were described in the commerce
clause)' or, Native American tribes. The issue is, to say the least, also very critical
to domestic politics in Canada, in Hawaii (given its separate origins and late
annexation in the United States), in Australia, in South Africa, and in New Zealand
where I lectured about this topic just recently.
Why does this topic have such urgency? It is not because of any distinctive
modem twist. Quite the contrary, it is a perpetual problem. Similar conflicts,
whose details are lost to recorded history, surely occurred more than 500 years ago
in North America before the European discovery of America. The dynamic of
indigenous rights conflicts needs only two self-evident truths to move into high
gear. First, land is immobile. Second, people are mobile. Those two brute facts
create two distinct scenarios. First, people manage to stumble into unoccupied
territory, thereby raising no immediate conflict between separate tribes or kin
groups. Or, alternatively, distinct tribes or groups will arrive in desired places that
are already inhabited. The burning issue is to resolve the tension between the early
and late arrivals.
Unfortunately, there are good reasons to expect frequent close encounters of the
second kind. Generally speaking, primitive tribes (or for that matter, their modem
equivalents) will seek out those lands that are most fertile, most arable, and most
suitable for hunting and (later on) to farming. Ancient peoples (as rational
calculators) often would rather brave the risk of fighting a locally-entrenched
population than try to tame some inhospitable territory where their claims would
be unchallenged, but which leave them as sole proprietors of places from which
they could not eke out the means of sustenance. Once these conflicts arise, the
somber historical truth is that the perceived necessities usually dominate immediate
actions. Philosophical reflection is reserved for a later date, after decisive, often
irreversible, and sometimes fatal steps have been taken.
Exile and extermination are not easily justified, nor are they quickly forgotten by
the losers. Where the punishments are harsh, the resentments are deep; these
resentments will surely come back to haunt deliberations at some later date when
the past necessities look a bit less compelling even to the parties who used (and use)
them to justify their actions. But, other times the scenario offers more than a ray
of hope. A new population arrives, and instead of engaging in conquest, it engages
in negotiation with the local populations. In some cases you got implicit
understandings, and in other cases, for example, in New Zealand, full scale
1. "Congress shall have the power to regulate... commerce... with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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negotiations complete with ratification proceedings took place. The upshot was the
Treaty of Waitangi, signed on the New Zealand's North Island in February of
1840.2 It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the treaty to the subsequent
historical, cultural, and constitutional development of New Zealand. It can be
rightly understood as New Zealand's most important founding document. It
represents the effort to substitute negotiation for conquest, and it is useful to
contrast the Treaty (and its key provisions) with other approaches to indigenous
populations.
I.

THE TENSION BETWEEN CONQUEST AND FIRST POSSESSION

I shall return to the Treaty in due course. By way of contrast, it is instructive to
look back to examine some Roman materials that treat the law of conquest in close
juxtaposition with the law of occupation. The connection is not entirely fortuitous,
for primitive and ancient cultures alike spend a huge amount of intellectual energy
addressing the question: how it is any person, or any tribe, comes to own property
in any land or chattel? The time and energy devoted to the refinement of these first
principles is far greater than it is in contemporary civilizations, where the stability
of possession is regarded as a given on all sides.' The contrast is evident if you ask
what it is that property lawyers today do for a living. On their plate are the
traditional questions of how land is conveyed, leased and mortgaged; but, it is also
the group of lawyers that deal with zoning, tax increment financing, condominiums,
planned unit developments, anti-growth ordinances, and regulatory takings. The
matters pertain to finance, use, and regulation, not original acquisition.
These complex topics do not resonate with anyone who studies earlier systems
of property law. Land use regulation occupied a small comer of the field. Roman
law, medieval English law, and continental law all had to pay far more attention to
initial and adverse possession, given the instability characteristic of so many
societies before (and even in) modem times. Developing the right rules on relative
title was no small matter, and that problem occupied the best minds of the day. To
put the point in another way, our tendency today is to think about property as a
subject of private law, where it is inextricably linked with commerce and trade.
But, from the vantage point of Roman or medieval lawyers, property, sovereignty,
territory, and government were very much intertwined. Ownership had a powerful
political dimension that placed it at the heart of public law.
With that said, the Romans adopted the naive rule for property, which they
regarded as "unowned" in the state of nature. Whatever the nagging philosophical
doubts of subsequent generations, to the ancient lawyer, anyone who got there first
2. Treaty of Waitangi, Feb. 6, 1840, U.K.-Maori Chiefs (visited Oct. 11, 1999)
<http://www.govt.nz/aboutnz/treaty.php3> [hereinafter Treaty of Waitangi].
3. See, e.g., INSTITUTES OF GAIUS § 66, at 83 (Francis De Zulueta, trans., Clarendon Press 2d
ed. 1958) (1946) [hereinafter GAIUS], which talks first about the acquisition of property by occupation,
which is sanctioned by natural law, and then addresses the analogous question of capture from the

enemy thusly: "By natural law also things captured from the enemy become ours." Id. § 69.
4. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 502 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1978)
(1740)) ("It follows, therefore, that the general rule, thatpossession must be stable, is not apply'd by
particular judgments, but by other general rules, which must extend to the whole society .... ").
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had title by occupation. Subsequent takers could not challenge the legitimacy of
their title.5 The same rules applied to wild animals under the rubric of the law of
capture. The Romans adopted this rule, but in its defense, typically offered only the
congenial if empty explanation, that treated the rule as one of natural reason-as
if there were some logical necessity instead of some practical reason for its
adoption. Since the initial possessor is in the right, it follows that the initial
dispossessor is in the wrong. Accordingly, the law developed an elaborate set of
procedures to allow the original owner to prevail against the initial dispossessor
(who in turn, by the doctrine of relative title, could prevail against anyone who
sought to wrest possession from him). "Prior in time is higher in right" was the
guiding principle in the legal response to the problem of social order. Sometimes
the point is put, "first come, first served" in the language of the street. But, here the
two conceptions differ, and the rules of priority have greater generality than those
which confine their attention to the first possessor only.6
The question of conquest introduces a practical monkey-wrench into this tidy
theoretical world. Your tribe or group takes over the territory of another; you kill
their members or throw them off their traditional lands. What principle determines
ownership if the question ever goes into litigation? The short answer is that God
is on the side of the big battalions. The second to arrive control the courts that
determine the law. It should come as no surprise that this law allows the latecomer
to prevail in their own courts.
The juxtaposition of the rule of first (or prior) possession, and the rule of
conquest builds a deep tension-I am tempted to call it a contradiction-into the
fabric of private law. Prior in time is higher in right only when it does not matter
all that much, which is not the way things work out in the political sphere. Now
sovereignty and property are in deep tension: we won control of the game, and it
does not matter when, or how, we got here at all. If you ask the Romans how it is
that they reconciled these two strands of thought, what you see is a deliberate,
scholastic evasion of the problem, which remains true to this present day. What
they said in effect is title to properties is acquired by nations through conquest-full
stop, period. Nothing is offered by way of justification; and a note of realism is
then injected by the gloomy observation that any disagreement among sovereigns
is typically resolved by resort to the law of war.7 Relations between tribes and
between nations are governed by a second set of principles that run opposite to their
jurisprudential intuitions on national justice and private disputes. That principle
5. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REv. 1221
(1979).

6. The source of the difference is this. First in time, highest in right resolves any conflict
between the initial possessor and those who take after him. But, if the initial possessor is out of the
picture, a rule of first possession has no impact. The rule of prior intime is higher in right covers both
situations, because it means that the second possessor prevails over the third on a doctrine of relative
title even when the first possessor is out of the way. It has always been a source of irony inteaching
property from Dukerninier &Krier's Property textbook to note that they mistranslate the Latin phrase
"Qui prior est ternpore potior est jure" to read as "Who is first in time is stronger in right." JESSIE
DUICEMINIER &JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY 3 (4th ed. 1998). The correct translation is: "Who is prior
in time is stronger in right." The case of the first possessor is a special case of the prior possessor who
cannot be trumped.
7. See GAIUS, supranote 3, § 94, at 181.
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could be summarized as one that says quite simply: No judge sitting in a court,
which is created by a particular sovereign, is allowed to challenge the legitimacy
of the sovereign's act, which put him there in the first place. It is the triumph of the
principle of positive over natural law; it is the force behind the command, not the
soundness of the rule that generates the command, that matters.' The judge who
happens to work for the winner, when that winner arrived on the scene in second
place, is never in a position to honor the title of somebody who came first. Instead
of appealing to principles of natural justice that were already accepted within his
own system, the judge has to recognize who calls the shots, and dresses up his
predicament with high sounding maxims, which go on to shape huge portions of the
subsequent law. In the end, the king can do no wrong, no writ can run against the
crown, given that the sovereign is the source of all law. The sacrifice here is quite
large, for to make the principle of sovereignty work, it becomes necessary for the
legal system to subordinate in its own partisan disputes the principles it uses as an
umpire in disputes between its own citizens. Yet this retreat from principle takes
place when the need for impartiality is the greatest. To make matters work, the
assertion of self-interest has to be reconciled with, and tempered by, the practical
demands of those conquered persons who fell under the rule of the conqueror. And,
here again the classical Roman conception has gained ground. The claim of the
prior inhabitants after conquest was not simply dismissed, but accepted by way of
supplication or sufferance; it was a precarious claim, but not a claim protected as
a matter of right.9 It occupied a twilight zone within the legal system. The
historical writings on the question of conquest thus revealed a built-in tension
between the philosophers who did not know or care about jurisdiction and sovereign
power, and the lawyers for whom jurisdiction and sovereign power were the first
issues that they had to confront.
What I want to do now is to fast forward by nearly 2000 years to examine the
American response to right of conquest. My focal point for this discussion is a case
that many have read in property and constitutional law, and perhaps forgotten. It
holds great importance not because its facts are complicated or convoluted, but
because they are simple and straightforward. Johnson v. McIntosh"0 is the case;
U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion in 1823. The case
turns on a title dispute that arose at the end of the Revolutionary War. After the
American rebels threw off the English government, the 1783 Treaty of Paris made
it very clear that any rights the English sovereign had, or any grant the English
sovereign had made to American subjects, was to be respected and enforced. The
chains of title that started before the Revolutionary War survived that war and the
transfer of sovereign power. It was (and is) clear that the key contest was between
the two root titles. Thus, if A took possession of property before B, and conveyed
it to A, after B conveyed that same property to B , then we have a situation where
8. As stated by Justice Holmes, "Asovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal rights
as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank,
205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
9. See, e.g., GAIus, supra note 3, § 7, at 67 (stating that ownership of the land in the Provinces
belongs to the Roman people, who then give possession and enjoyment of that land to its residents).
10. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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A proceeds B, while B, proceeds A. It would be utterly ruinous to adopt a system
in which any contest of title between A, and B, was determined by the date at which
they took title to the premises. By that rule A could not convey to A, at all, lest the
title be forfeited to B or B,. Land would have to remain in the hands of its original
owner to ward off the claims of outsiders, and all social gains from its free
alienation would be lost. So, the rule prior in time is higher in right does not apply
to A, and B1 . It applies to A and B, who have the root titles to the rival chains. In
our case, the plaintiff Johnson claimed his title "through the Piankeshaw and
Illinois Indians who have conveyed a title unto me, which I now claim to be
valid."" The defendant McIntosh claimed title through a subsequent grant (in terms
of its root) that had the imprimatur of the United States.
In thinking about this dispute, one question worth asking is how the Piankeshaw
and Illinois Indians conveyed title. Chief Justice Marshall was a great Justice in
part because he refused to fudge matters of fact in order to avoid difficult questions
of principle. He did not quarrel with the idea that the chiefs had conveyed title. He
did not invoke any principle of ethnic relativism to question whether the chiefs had,
or could have had, full and complete authority, vis-A-vis their own people, to
convey title to the disputed lands.'2 In subsequent times, the question of whether
chiefs could convey for their tribes, or indeed, whether the land was alienable at all,
became constant sources of tension that provoked lots of litigation. But for Chief
Justice Marshall the chain of title was perfectly coherent. An American title could
rest on an Indian title, which in turn could rest quite comfortably on the principle
of first possession. And, the one indisputable fact is the Indian tribes arrived first.
McIntosh's title to land was second in time as of its origin, but it did come
through the U.S. government.'3 He rode the wrong horse, which had the right
backer. So place yourself in the shoes of Chief Justice Marshall to ask what
decision you will reach in this competition between the earlier and later title. Do
this, moreover, in the context of Indian tribes in the American West during the
1820s. The case presents him with little that is new by way of conflict. But he
decides the case in favor of the home team.
Let me now briefly review his arguments. Marshall begins with the claim that
any society has the right to prescribe the general rules whereby property is acquired
and preserved. Of course to some extent his claim has got to be right. It would be
weird and self-defeating to assert that a well-run state was incapable of creating
rules over property rights. What Marshall does not mention, however, is that the
state, including the United States, typically does not invoke any far-flung
conception to establish the rules that govern property rights in disputes between its
own citizens. Rather, a well-functioning state respects the rule, prior in time is
higher in right, as outlined above. But, in this case one grantee traces his origin
back to the sovereign. Chief Justice Marshall will not question the authority of his
employer in its own courts. He has not deviated an iota from the Roman position.
Knowing that might makes right, it seems clear that the defendant McIntosh is
a fore-ordained victor. Chief Justice Marshall, however, like any judge sitting in
11. Id.at 550.
12. See id. at 550, 554-55, 557.
13. See id. at 559.
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any court, feels enormously uneasy about endorsing the might makes right
principle. So, he cleverly reaches out for rationales that might soften the impact of
that crude sovereign command. Casting about for suitable arguments, Marshall's
backed-handed, ironic half tongue-in-cheek prose is very difficult to capture unless
you read the words aloud. 4 In the end, he concludes that the principle that lays
behind the sovereign claim is that of discovery. 5 Discovery allowed those people
of superior genius-that is Marshall's phrase for Europeans 6-to temper their
disagreements over the division of the new world. In a nutshell this principle said:
That nation which discovers a particular territory first has the first shot at its
occupation and control. 7
This approach deals in a sensible way with what is today termed the issue of
"inchoate title," and the issue comes up all the time. Today, for example, when my
friend and I were driving around looking for a parking place, I came across a
woman whose car stopped, waiting to enter a parking space that was being vacated
by a man backing his car out. I asked my friend, in anticipation of this lecture, "are
you going to take the parking space if you can grab it first?" He said "no." I asked
why not, and he said, "because she's waiting for it." I responded "You are a living
embodiment of the principle of inchoate title at common law. You know you have
the right to occupy any space that you are poised to enter at the first immediate
opportunity, such that anybody else who tries to win under the so-called first
possession rule will be regarded as an interloper."'" The same intuition we have
14. See id. at 589 ("Although we do not mean to engage in the defence of those principles which
Europeans have applied to Indian title, they may, we think, find some excuse, if not justification, in
the character and habits of the people whose rights have been wrested from them."). Elsewhere he
writes: "Frequent and bloody wars, in which the whites were not always the aggressors, unavoidably
ensued." Id. at 590.
15. See id. at 567.
16. "[IThe great nations of Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it as they
could respectively acquire. Its vast extent offered an ample field to the ambition and enterprise of all;
and the character and religion of its inhabitants afforded an apology for considering them as a people
over whom the superior genius of Europe might claim an ascendency. The potentates of the old world
found no difficulty in convincing themselves that they made ample compensation to the inhabitants
of the new, by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity, in exchange for unlimited
independence." Id. at 572-73.
17. Seeid. at584.
18. As an aside, there are marginal cases for all clear principles. Years ago as I was driving north
looking for a parking place on South Columbus Drive near the Art Institute in Chicago, I just
happened to see ahead a man pulling out of a space on a block that was otherwise filled with cars.
Confident of my good fortune, I waited behind until he pulled out, and then pulled forward to back
in, only to find my way blocked by a car that had pulled up behind me. That car had been waiting at
the south end of the block when I drove past it, and its driver thought that he had the right to the first
space that came free on the block, which he was prepared to enforce in a visible way. My wife vetoed
further confrontation, but I still grumbled a bit about the matter as I paid my way into the city garage.
I have never seen the practice duplicated. Nor am I sure that I am right about how it should come.
Certainly in a world of queuing he would have the advantage over me. Indeed (to continue this
diversion) the reason why banks and airlines have single queues for service is to avoid the risk that a
person who arrives later on line A is served before someone who arrives earlier on line B. The effort
here is to avoid strategic behavior (wife in one line, husband in the other), which happens when
separate queues are created. The cost of the new system is, of course, the administrative expense of
setting up the dual queuing relationships.
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about parking spots in the garages or parking lots in Bowling Green and Toledo is
what the Spanish, Portuguese, and English had in the late fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries. It was essentially their version of spheres of influence. It
worked very well in a regime of mutual respect: the English won't kill the Spanish,
and the Spanish won't kill the Portuguese. But people are not parking spaces, so
that it also meant each of them had to leave to slaughter any local inhabitants who
stood in their way. They developed a system where they could parcel out countries
among themselves, but they did so in a way which meant indigenous populations
had no rights. It is not as though the rule is useful; it is the kind of rule that only
appeals to the sovereign in the sovereign's own court. 9 It is not the type of
argument that is likely to impress anybody outside the jurisdiction who wants to
advance and protect the particular Indian clients. That is the first argument that
Chief Justice Marshall makes, it is not a very good one and he knows it is not a very
good one.
Chief Justice Marshall thus comes up with a second argument to bolster his
initial foray. It is basically a variation on the just compensation argument used in
takings cases.2' Essentially we can identify only two legitimate ways government
can acquire title to private property. Conquest is not one of them. The first
legitimate way is to offer cash to buy property. The great advantage of this
approach is that it is the path of least resistance. Much of the land acquired by the
United States and the individual states is done through voluntary purchase, without
explicit resort to the eminent domain power.2 ' The second legitimate fashion is to
take the land, but to make an offer as determined by a neutral party, as is done in
ordinary condemnation cases. What is the form of compensation? Usually it is
cash. Chief Justice Marshall, however, cleverly justified the European takeover of
the Indian territories by noting they were amply compensated. What form of
compensation had the Europeans provided them? In Marshall's mind, the benefits
were not in cash, but in kind. Here there is philosophical precedent for the basic
position. Scottish philosopher David Hume made the basic point long before
Marshall.

19. Marshall made the point as follows:
The United States, then, have unequivocally acceded to that great and broad rule [of discovery]
by which its civilized inhabitants now hold this country. They hold, and assert in themselves,
the title by which it was acquired. They maintain, as all others have maintained, that discovery
gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by
conquest ....
The power now possessed by the government of the United States to grant lands, resided,
while we were colonies, in the crown or its grantees. The validity of the titles given by either
has never been questioned in our Courts.
Id. at 587-88 (emphasis added). Later Marshall noted: "Conquest gives a title which the Courts of
the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be,
respecting the original justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted." Id. at 588.
20. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823).
21. Seeid.at568.
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Property must be stable, and must be fix'd by general rules. Tho' in one instance the
public be a sufferer, this momentary ill is amply compensated by the steady
prosecution of the rule, and by the peace and order, which it establishes in society.
And even every individual person must find himself a gainer, on ballancing the
account; since, without justice, society must immediately dissolve, and every one must
fall into that savage and solitary condition, which is infinitely worse than the worst
situation that can possibly be suppos'd in society.'
Marshall points to two such implicit benefits: Christianity and civilization. "The

potentates of the old world found no difficulty in convincing themselves that they
made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new, by bestowing on them
civilization and Christianity, in exchange for unlimited independence"D-gains
which we could confer upon them because of the "superior genius" of Europe. As
a specialist in takings law, I have long stressed the theme of implicit in-kind
compensation. 24 The point here quite simply is that the just compensation
requirement, whether as a matter of economic or constitutional theory, does not
require that the state provide cash compensation whenever it takes property or, in
what amounts to a partial taking, restrict the state's use. Instead it may provide a
landowner with other forms of benefits that are a sufficient substitute. Chief Justice
Marshall anticipated this principle, and perceived its general appeal. For example,
if the state takes land for a highway from a given individual without giving him a
dime, the individual now has one less acre of land with an abutting highway in its
stead. But, the acreage the individual retains may now be worth twice as much, so
why should the state be required to fork over land to that individual? When the dust
settles, he has land worth $200 where before the invocation of state power he had
land worth $100. The realities were not lost on ordinary citizens, and in colonial
times landowners actively sought to get the government to build highways on or
near their properties, or offer the land for free, because so great were the benefits
of greater access to markets and of the security deriving from an internal system of
transportation.
Given this rosy scenario, it is a fair question to ask: Why use the eminent domain
power at all when people are vying to have their lands taken? Sometimes a takings
power is required to overcome the coordination problem that arises when the land
of many individuals has to be assembled into a highway. One bad actor could
disrupt the entire operation by holding out for a lion's share of the gain. The threat
of state compulsion (which carries with it the risk of abuse) is meant to negate that
holdout risk. By the same token, however, the holdout who is forced to succumb
to the collective will is not wiped out altogether, but receives instead compensation
for the property surrendered. That compensation in turn must be calibrated and
supplied. The usual way to measure implicit in-kind benefits is by their return
value to the individual who has been forced to surrender land or lose values to the
common project. The reason the approach worked with the highway cases is that
22. HuME, supra note 4, at 497.
23. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573.
24. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 195-215 (1985).
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the individuals who gained the highway (especially when built with public moneys)
received abundant in-kind compensation, so that the constitutional requirement was
satisfied without the fuss and bother of financial calculations.25
The origins of the theory of in-kind compensation predate the McIntosh decision.
So, how does this theme play out when the analysis moves up a level, to take into
account the treatment of the Piankeshaw Indians? A bit of reflection should show
you that the tight logic that explains the highway cases does not carry over. Indeed
this appeal to the theme of just compensation strikes me as just wrong. One
element of the compensation theme stresses the issue of subjective value. The rule
requires that what is given in exchange be valued by the people who receive it: it
is not satisfied by showing that we think that we have provided them with
something of value. So, the question that the critic wants asked is this: Do the
Piankeshaw want a civilization that the Europeans were determined to impose on
them whether they wanted it or not? Or were the benefits of civilization solely to
force other cultures to abandon their own traditions and to take second fiddle in
ours? What Chief Justice Marshall frames as a benefit could be recharacterized as
a detriment, or even as a totalitarian excess. It is not as though the Europeans who
conquered native tribes had tribal welfare as their dominant objective.
It is not that this set of questions is wholly without replies. But it is difficult to
give a set of replies that puts all, or even most of these concerns, at ease. For one
thing, the relationships between Europeans and Indian tribes were not constant
across all places and all tribes. One strong relationship characteristic between the
European settlers and the Indian tribes in the Eastern United States before Marshall
wrote his opinion in 1823 was the extensive use of treaties that involved the
normalization of relations and the sale of territories-practices that got rid of some
of the sting of European entry. But, we have no demonstration of whether, or if so
how, that was true in this particular case. Looking at these issues, a somewhat
beleaguered Chief Justice Marshall concluded that he did not seek to evaluate the
change in circumstances to decide whether there were benefits, detriments, or
neither. He just presumed his point to make the paradigm work, and then let his
sovereign do exactly as it pleased.26
25. For a somewhat different view, see Frank Michelman, Tutelary Jurisprudence and
ConstitutionalProperty, in LIBERTY PROPERTY, AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
127, 130 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1990) (citing William Treanor, Note, The
Origins and OriginalSignificance of the Just CompensationClause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE
L.J. 694 (1985)) ("Thus, while the early practice would characteristically omit compensation in the
case of public roads built across unimproved land, it would pay when the land was improved. Treanor
suggests no motivation for payment other than prevailing precepts of good governmental practice or
political morality."). Note that a more precise explanation is available. Improved land is worth far
more, so that the net balance is likely to get altered if it can be taken on the same terms as unimproved
land. The prohibition also gives the roadbuilder an incentive for sound location of the road in
question, and removes the tendency for individuals to'seek to place the road on the neighbor's property
where it does them great benefit and little harm. The rule provides that owners owe a duty of lateral
support for the land of the neighbor, but not the improvements erected on it. See Corporation of
Birmingham v. Allen, 6 Ch.D. 284, 289 (C.A. 1877) (per Jessel, M.R.). I discuss the point in Richard
A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: CorrectiveJustice and Its UtilitarianConstraints,8 J.LEGAL STUD. 49,
94-96 (1979).
26. See McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587.
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Yet, it is too easy to glide over the difficulties stated in this problem. Someone
now has to face the unenviable task of deciding what it is the sovereign wants to do.
That problem requires some collective deliberation even under an emperor, and the
Roman precedents make it clear the right of conquest does not normally bring with
it the extermination of the local population. So, how then does the sovereign
proceed? Surely, it cannot be by taking direct and immediate possession of all the
homes, shops, and farms of local residents and artisans. The recognition of the right
of occupancy was the payoff from this caution. Until a title by occupancy was
disturbed, it continued to receive respect, notwithstanding the change in sovereign
control. All disputes between individuals and the conquered nation were resolved
just as they were before. So, the key question was whether the conquering
sovereign decided to stay its hand.
On this question it is possible to detect important shifts in attitudes between the
events of Chief Justice Marshall's day and today. Thus, Marshall again does not
mince words when he notes that the grants involved in McIntosh were not grants of
sovereign power, that is, grants that respected the local land titles on the ground.
Rather, they were styled as grants of ownership and sovereignty. "A charter
intended to convey political power only, would never contain words expressly
granting the land, the soil, and the waters."27 As a rule of construction this
conclusion is unexceptionable, even for those who think the charters should have
been more respectful of the rights of indigenous people. But, Marshall was not one
to indulge in the modem practice of twisting language in order to pretend that
unpleasant results were not intended by charters, or, one might add, statutes. He
played the game of interpretation with supreme indifference to the substantive
content of the outcome. The modem cases that have followed McIntosh have
protected the sovereign claims, even in circumstances where the native tribes were
not subdued by conquest, but allowed to continue in the occupation of their lands.2"
Yet, once again, a change in attitude toward conquest becomes critical whenever
state grants are less expressive of their coverage scope. Thus, the standard default
provision holds that the ordinary private relationships between individuals survive
conquest. Now, it is necessary for the state grantee to clearly establish his title to
private lands. When the modem indigenous claims are recognized in many of these
countries, it is not because people have rejected the 'sovereign might makes right'
paradigm which dominated Chief Justice Marshall. Rather, they changed views on
the minor premise, and were much more reluctant to say that the government's
ownership was meant to disrupt private relationships. Raise the bar high enough,
and by degrees the default provision hardens into a substantive rule of law, which
reflects the newer sensibilities.
So, how did they work this transformation in presumptions? They reintroduced
natural law arguments through the back door. The courts say something like: "We
will assume we have a sovereign, but we believe that our sovereign is a just
27. Id. at 580.
28. See generallyTee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). Yet, even here in
the end Congress did provide compensation for the lands taken by the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act of 1971, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601. For commentary, see Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court,
Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FoUND. RES. J. 1.
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sovereign, who will not act unjustly. We will construe grants accordingly unless
and until we have very clear evidence to suggest the contrary." That shift becomes
evident as we move from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century in, for example,
the New Zealand and Australian settings, where the willingness of the sovereign to
disrupt local tribal and governance arrangements within territories was not nearly
so strong as it had been 100 years before. By this time, the default rule against loss
of private rights held strong, so that native tribes and populations had done quite
well in sustaining their claims against the political sovereign. 9
I do not have time (nor the knowledge) to go into this development in any great
detail. But, I do wish to return again to the philosophical ironies that arise in
dealing with the rights of indigenous peoples. Thus far I have spoken broadly about
the problems of conquest. The alternative to conquest is, of course, contract, that
is, treaties between nations. Here again natural law theory accords a high place to
voluntary agreement, and finds no reason to retreat from that position with regard
to treaties entered into between nations and tribes. Let me briefly return again to
the situation in New Zealand where relationships between Europeans and Maori are
governed by the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi. The importance of this Treaty for
contemporary New Zealand life cannot be overstated, and much of this has to do
simply with the question of numbers. No matter how difficult and delicate the
issues of indigenous people in the United States, the problem cannot become a
nation-breaker because the indigenous populations are too small in number. How
one counts descendants is always a problem in a world of intermarriage, but still the
estimates of indigenous populations hover about the one percent figure. But, with
New Zealand, the numbers are far higher, subject again to the same intermarriage
caveat. There, the local understandings do hold the risk of destabilizing a nation,
given a large Maori population in a small nation of about 3.5 million individuals.
If you want the amount to scale with the American situation, you would have to
assume there are 50 to 55 million people in this country where Native American
extractions have perceived themselves as second-class citizens.
Understood in its own terms, the negotiation of the Treaty of Waitangi reveals
a level of messiness that is proportionate to its overall importance within the New
Zealand setting.3" Before the arrival of the English, the North and South Island
were occupied by Maori tribes, which often clashed with each other. Their own
tribal boundaries and the methods by which they organized land holdings were quite
different from our own. The question of land ownership is not easy to define when
tribes camp and move on, for it is often a matter of genuine delicacy to decide
whether they have moved about from one part of their holdings to another, or
whether, in the alternative, they first occupy and then abandon certain lands. The
Maori did not think about the ownership question in the terms that are congenial to
Western thought, and it is not clear how they would have fielded questions about
their internal system of land control. After Captain Cook "discovered" New
Zealand, the English came in substantial numbers before 1840 and were to some
extent welcome because of what they could offer to sell by way of trade. They
purchased land in individual transactions from various Maori who may or may not
29. See generally Mabo v. State of Queensland (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.
30.

For a detailed account, see generally CLAUDIA ORANGE, THE TREATY OF WAITANGI (1987).
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have had title, by deals which may or may not have been properly concluded. This
practice continued for at least ten or fifteen years before the Treaty until New
Zealand contained a fairly large smattering of British settlers. At this point
relations become strained, and things got a little uneasy until the Colonial Office
dispatched Captain Hobson to New Zealand to negotiate a treaty that would bring
British Sovereignty to New Zealand.
By 1840 the British and the Maori entered into the Treaty of Waitangi2' There
is of course an enormous question of how it is to be validated, given the large
number of separate tribes that have to pass on it before it is approved. But, even if
we put aside the complexities of the ratification debate, the Treaty is only a page
or two long, and contains its fair share of interpretive difficulties. Let me mention
just a couple critical points to give a flavor of what is at stake.
First, the Treaty (in its English version) guarantees to all the native Maori tribes
"the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests
Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or individually possess
.... '32 This is a major concession to local rights and the quid pro quo from the
English versions of the Treaty (it is less clear in the Maori versions of the treaty)33
is that the British Crown will assume sovereignty over the islands, and they in turn
will treat all the local citizens who are Maori in extraction as having equal dignity
with the English. 4 Even in the English version, this system is, compared to the
brutal practices of conquest from ancient times forward, a model of political
detachment and self-restraint. The mechanism for the control of land, however,
creates many unwelcome complexities because it notes the Maori act both as
individuals and as tribes, which is the import of the phrase "individually or
collectively possess" just quoted above. But, the Treaty does not say in which cases
it is possible for individuals, and in which cases it is necessary for groups to convey
property. The Treaty also provides, however, that the Crown has a right of
preemption,3 5 which means only the Crown or its designated individuals can
purchase the land. This provision has both a good and a bad side. The good side
is that it prevents unscrupulous shysters from taking over the land by swindle and
artifice. Their transactions are voided by the preemptive right. The bad side is that
the Crown now has a monopoly on dealing with Native Tribes. This favoritism lets
that one preferred buyer get a very attractive price for the land, which would have
been worth far more in an open economy. Once this Treaty is put into place all
sorts of transactions take place, and just as you would expect people get sloppy.
There are various transactions that take place between the Maori and the white
31. See generallyTreaty of Waitangi, supra note 2.
32. Id. at art. II.
33. See id. at art. III. "The Queen of England acknowledges and guarantees to the Chiefs, the
Tribes, and all the people of New Zealand, the entire supremacy of their lands, of their settlements, and
of all their personal property." ORANGE, supra note 30, at 262.
34. See Treaty of Waitangi, supra note 2, at art. III ("[I]n consideration thereof Her Majesty the
Queen of England extends to the Natives of New Zealand Her royal protection and imparts to them
all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects.").
35. See id. at art. II ("[B]ut the Chiefs of the United Tribes and the individual Chiefs yield to Her
Majesty the exclusive right of Preemption over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be disposed
to alienate ...").
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population, which do not go through the Crown. There are some transactions that
go through the Crown, subject to allegations of irregularity associated with the sale.
The movement from conquest to Treaty was designed to eliminate the tension
between title by conquest and the general rule of first possession. But, while the
Treaty solves one large problem, it creates many smaller problems in its stead,
which have to be sorted out over the generations.
To make matters worse, the Treaty of Waitangi has little if anything to say about
the question of prescriptive rights, which allows possession over long periods of
time to cure any defects in the manner in which title is acquired. 36 That rule works
wonders when a formal legal rule requires that specific words be spoken, that
certain witnesses be present, or that certain formalities attach to written documents.
Careless people often forget to do these things, or do them incorrectly. But, with
the passage of time the defects in form are forgotten so that it becomes possible for
the original buyer, or his heir or donee, to convey good title to some stranger 50 or
100 years later. The system of title will unravel (as it has in Eastern Europe after
the massive political unrest) if these defects in form are allowed to vitiate the
original transactions in perpetuity. Yet, the Treaty of Waitangi never addresses the
question of whether or how these prescriptive rights are acquired. So the principle
of finality that private law regimes seek is not provided for explicitly in the Treaty,
and has to be read in as part of a system of background norms of legal conveyances.
Without it you have an open wound that continues to fester over time. The problem
is only made worse because the lack of clear conviction on prescription in the
current scene translates into a lack of resolve on the issue of finality. It is possible
to run historical investigations of the circumstances surrounding the signing of the
Treaty and the early land grants once, twice, and still again. That has happened in
New Zealand with the creation in 1975 of the Waitangi Tribunal whose major
function is to examine what forms of redress should be provided for injustices done
to the Maori pursuant to, or in spite of, the Treaty of Waitangi. At this point the
role of the Treaty is reversed. No longer does it mark a once-and-for-all transition
to an integrated system of sovereignty for the British and the Maori in which all
future issues are legislative, not constitutional issues. Instead, the Treaty itself
becomes a generative source of new obligations that are always vetted before the
standing Tribunal. That entire mode of doing business makes it harder to normalize
political relationships between the British and the Maori.
So, where does this tangled history, of which I have given just a glimpse, leave
us? For me, it raises two kinds of issues. One of them is a deep conviction: the
more you know about any particular sequence of titles, conquests, conveyances, and
transfers, the less confident you are in your judgments as to how these disputes
should be worked out. There is too much uncertainty and there are too many factual
variations to handle at once. The problem is, moreover, not unique to the
intersection of Western and indigenous populations. It arises in Eastern Europe
when first the Nazis, and then the Communists, dispossess people of their land. It
is possible to snarl titles in the space of a generation or two. But, these questions
36. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law

of Property,64 WAsH. U. L.Q. 667 (1986); Thomas W. Merrill, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and
Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1122 (1984).
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have to be resolved, and in most cases that settlement should be for hard cash, as
opposed to the return of land that is. often altered beyond recognition, done on a
once-and-for-all basis. Having said that, it is hard to dictate terms in the abstract
without a clearer sense of the particulars of each case.
My second point stresses again the ironic intersection between philosophy and
politics. The academic literature on the left makes its living attacking the primitive
Lockean notion that individuals acquire property when they "mix" their labor with
the land. That theory is often said to stand in the way of an equitable distribution
of resources within society. But, it is just this theory of original acquisition that
fuels the indigenous claims and makes it hard for those of us with more
conservative inclinations to dismiss them out of hand. Now, every lawyer and
anthropologist who testifies on the issue will emphasize the priority of possession
of indigenous populations. The Lockean norms that are derided abstractly turn out
to be decisive in dealing with intercultural conflicts.
With that stated, I sit here in a kind of delightful, but enigmatic, position. I have
always had an inordinate fondness for the first possession rule, and will happily
defend its place in the legal hierarchy against any and all comers. I think the
principle has as much relevance to the key claims of indigenous populations as it
does the claims of everyone else. But, lest it appear that I am squarely in their
camp, recall that I give equal weight to the rule of prescription, the validity of
treaties, and the principle of finality. If you put the two halves of the debate
together, the subtle appreciation of the rich theory of property rights shows that the
upshot is a mess. The conceptual resolution of this problem is every bit as inelegant
as the practical ones I have talked about. But, perhaps there is this silver lining. If
the question is a mess for one side, then it is also a mess for the other side. A fuller
appreciation of the issues of sound treaty interpretation and practice should
convince all sides of the vulnerabilities of their position. Once that is understood
people might see the dangers in excessive attachments to their own view. They
may then be able to achieve that frame of mind that allows them to inch forward
toward a sensible compromise of an issue that could flare up into a major source of
social tension. The stakes are high everywhere this problem arises, but with
patience and goodwill, perhaps some sensible accommodation can be reached,
which will allow us then to go forward in greater harmony with the business of life.
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